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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
The State appeals from the district court’s order granting Brian McGraw’s motion to
suppress.  This Court should affirm because the district court correctly concluded that the officer
who stopped the vehicle in which Mr. McGraw was a passenger abandoned the purpose of the
stop when he handed his ticket book to one of his colleagues in order to run his drug dog around
the vehicle, which unreasonably extended the stop, in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the
United States Constitution.
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
Officer Jason Green was on routine patrol when he ran a license plate he observed on a
vehicle parked at Walmart, recognized the name of the registered owner, and then “determined
[he] was going [to] follow the vehicle to see if it made any traffic infractions.”  (2/10/17 Tr., p.9,
Ls.4-14, p.35, L.11 – p.36, L.12, p.39, L.24 – p.40, L.5.)  Officer Green was asked at the
suppression hearing, “Were you looking for a reason to pull her over?”  (2/10/17 Tr., p.40,
Ls.19-20.)  He answered, “As I said, I was looking for a reason—for a traffic infraction, yes, sir.”
(2/10/17 Tr., p.40, Ls.21-22.)
After following the vehicle for approximately four miles, Officer Green observed the
driver fail to signal a lane change “for an appropriate amount of time” and observed the vehicle
“fail[ ] to maintain [its] lane.”  (2/10/17 Tr., p.10, L.24 – p.11, L.5, p.22, Ls.2-13.)  Officer Green
initiated a traffic stop, and asked the driver and the passenger for identification.  (2/10/17
Tr., p.11, Ls.6-15.)  The driver, Lacey Killeen, provided her license and proof of insurance.
(2/10/17 Tr., p.12, Ls.3-13, p.13, Ls.16-22.)  The passenger identified himself as Brian McGraw.
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(2/10/17 Tr., p.12, Ls.14-18, p.13, Ls.16-22.)  Officer Green asked Ms. Killeen and Mr. McGraw
if  “anybody  was  on  probation  or  parole”  and  Mr.  McGraw  stated  he  was  on  parole.   (2/10/17
Tr., p.12, Ls.17-25.)  Officer Green testified that, at that point, he “determined that [he] was
going to eventually utilize my narcotics detection canine around the vehicle.”  (2/10/17 Tr., p.13,
Ls.5-8.)
After verifying that Ms. Killeen’s license and registration were valid, and that there were
no  outstanding  warrants  for  Ms.  Killeen  or  Mr.  McGraw,  Officer  Green  asked  Ms.  Killeen  to
step out of the vehicle.  (2/10/17 Tr., p.14, Ls.14-24.)  Officer Green asked her for permission to
search the vehicle, and she did not consent.  (2/10/17 Tr., p.15, Ls.6-14.)  Officer Green began
filling out a citation for Ms. Killeen for failure to maintain a lane.  (2/10/17 Tr., p.15, Ls.15-19,
p.30, Ls.11-15.)
Officer Green testified that Officer Marshall Plaisted then “took over the citation writing”
while he retrieved his canine.  (2/10/17 Tr., p.15, L.23 – p.16, L.5.)  Officer Plaisted testified,
“At that point Officer Green was filling out a traffic citation.  He handed it to me and asked that I
continue to fill it out.  I believe we discussed what the citation was going to be for and I began
filling out the citation.”  (2/10/17 Tr., p.47, Ls.15-19.)  After watching the on-body video
recording of the traffic stop at the suppression hearing, Officer Plaisted acknowledged he did not
start writing the citation immediately after Officer Green handed him his ticket book.  (2/10/17
Tr., p.55, Ls.4-6.)  Officer Plaisted also acknowledged it took him more time to complete the
citation than it would have if Officer Green had completed it.  (2/10/17 Tr., p.58, Ls.10-17.)
Indeed, the video recording reflects that there was an approximately 40-second delay from when
Officer Plaisted received the ticket book from Officer Green, and when Officer Plaisted resumed
writing the citation.  (State’s Ex. 2, 2:44-3:25.)
3
After handing off his ticket book, Officer Green walked his canine around Ms. Killeen’s
vehicle, and the dog alerted at an open window.  (2/10/17 Tr., p.16, Ls.8-18.)  A search of the
vehicle revealed marijuana in the center console, methamphetamine in a “female-style sock” in
the glove box, and methamphetamine in Ms. Killeen’s purse.  (2/10/17 Tr., p.17, L.11 – p.18,
L.9.)  The State charged Mr. McGraw by Information with felony possession of a controlled
substance.  (R., pp.33-34.)  The district court consolidated Mr. McGraw’s case with
Ms. Killeen’s case, CR01-16-25070.  (R., pp.44-45, 46-47.)  Mr. McGraw filed a motion to
suppress all evidence arguing, inter alia, that “law enforcement delayed the duration of the stop
in order to conduct a K9 search of the vehicle,” in violation of the United States and Idaho
Constitutions, relying on Rodriguez v. United States, __ U.S. __, 135 S.Ct. 1609 (2015), and
State v. Linze, 161 Idaho 605 (2016).  (R., pp.59-60, 61-65.)
The district court granted Mr. McGraw’s motion to suppress, concluding Officer Green
abandoned the purpose of the stop when he handed his ticket book to Officer Plaisted in order to
run his dog around the vehicle.  (2/10/17 Tr., p.72, Ls.2-11.).  The district court explained its
reasoning as follows:
It  is  clear to me given the sequence of events that  Officer Green himself
actually did abandon the purpose of the stop when he handed the ticket book off
to Officer Plaisted.
And I appreciate that it took somewhere between two and five seconds to
exchange the ticket book, but that act and the act of Officer Plaisted then leaving
the hood of the car and going into the car to turn the lights off and going around
the  back  of  the  car  to  begin  writing  the  citation  and,  frankly,  while  he  was
moderately engaging Ms. Killeen in an apparent effort to complete the citation, it
appeared  to  me  that  he  was  likely  covering  Officer  Green  at  the  same  time.   It
would be difficult to believe, and I would find it incredible, if he were to have told
me that he wasn’t paying attention to Officer Green while he was ostensibly
writing  the  citation  and  he  wasn’t  continuously  writing  the  citation  from  my
review of the evidence.  So I think that Officer Green, in fact, did abandon that
purpose.
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(2/10/17 Tr., p.70, L.11 – p.71, L.7.)  The district court entered a written order granting
Mr. McGraw’s motion to suppress, and the State filed a timely appeal.  (R., pp.95-96, 97-100.)
On August 8, 2017, the Idaho Supreme Court entered an order granting the State’s motion to
consolidate this appeal with the appeal in Ms. Killeen’s case, No. 44942, stating that
Mr. McGraw and Ms. Killeen may each file his/her own Respondent’s Brief.
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ISSUE
Did the district court correctly grant Mr. McGraw’s motion to suppress?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Correctly Granted Mr. McGraw’s Motion To Suppress
This Court should affirm the district court’s order granting Mr. McGraw’s motion to
suppress because the district court correctly concluded that Officer Green abandoned the purpose
of the stop when he handed his ticket book to Officer Plaisted in order to run a drug dog around
Ms. Killeen’s vehicle, which unreasonably extended the stop, in violation of the Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution.
“In reviewing a district court order granting or denying a motion to suppress evidence,
the standard of review is bifurcated.” State v. Purdum, 147 Idaho 206, 207 (2009) (citation
omitted).   “This  Court  will  accept  the  trial  court’s  findings  of  fact  unless  they  are  clearly
erroneous.  However, this Court may freely review the trial court’s application of constitutional
principles in light of the facts found.” Id. (citations omitted).  “At a suppression hearing, the
power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw
factual inferences is vested in the trial court.” State v. Aguirre, 141 Idaho 560, 562 (Ct. App.
2005) (citations omitted).
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects “[t]he right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures .  .  .  .”   U.S. Const.  amend. IV.  “The seizure of a vehicle’s occupants in order to
investigate a traffic violation is a ‘reasonable seizure’ under the Fourth Amendment so long as
the seizing officer had reasonable suspicion that a violation had occurred.” Linze, 161 Idaho at
608 (citing Rodriguez, 135 S.Ct. at 1614.)  However, “[b]ecause addressing the infraction is the
purpose of the stop, it may last no longer than is necessary to effectuate that purpose.”
Rodriguez, 135 S.Ct. at 1614 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).  “Authority for the
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seizure thus ends when tasks tied to the traffic infraction are—or reasonably should have been—
completed.” Id.
In Rodriguez,  the  United  States  Supreme  Court  held  “a  police  stop  exceeding  the  time
needed to handle the matter for which the stop was made violates the Constitution’s shield
against unreasonable seizures.”  135 S.Ct. at 1612.  The Court explained, “[t]he critical question .
. . is . . . whether conducting the sniff prolongs—i.e., adds time to—the stop.” Id. at 1615
(internal quotation marks omitted).  In Linze, the Idaho Supreme Court held a police officer
violated Mr. and Mrs. Linze’s rights under the Fourth Amendment by delaying a traffic stop for
two and a half minutes while performing a back-up function for a drug dog sweep.  161 Idaho at
609.  The Court explained that a traffic stop “remains a reasonable seizure while the officer
diligently pursues the purpose of the stop” but if the officer abandons the purpose of the stop, the
seizure is no longer supported by the original reasonable suspicion for the stop. Id.
Here, Officer Green abandoned the (purported) purpose of the stop when he handed his
ticket  book  to  Officer  Plaisted,  and  asked  Officer  Plaisted  to  continue  writing  the  citation  for
Ms. Killeen while he ran his drug dog around the vehicle.1  The State argues in its  Appellant’s
Brief that the purpose of the stop was not abandoned because “the officers cumulatively
continued to diligently pursue the purpose of the stop.”  (Appellant’s Br., p.5.)  The State is
incorrect.  While the officers may, arguably, have “cumulatively continued” to pursue the traffic
citation, there is no question that the handing off of the ticket book from Officer Green to Officer
Plaisted mid-citation delayed, i.e., added time, to the stop.  The analysis is straightforward under
Rodriguez, and the constitutional violation is clear.
1 The purported purpose of the stop was the observed traffic violations.  However, it is clear the
actual reason Officer Green followed, and eventually stopped, Ms. Killeen’s vehicle was to
conduct a drug investigation.  The State has never argued that there was reasonable suspicion or
probable cause for a drug investigation.
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The video recording of the incident, which was introduced into evidence at the
suppression hearing, reflects that there was an approximately 40-second delay from when Officer
Plaisted received the ticket book from Officer Green, and when Officer Plaisted resumed writing
the citation.  (State’s Ex. 2, 2:44-3:25.)  In addition to this obvious, objective delay, the district
court also found Officer Plaisted “was likely covering Officer Green” while he ran his drug dog
around the vehicle, and “wasn’t continuously writing the citation.”  (2/10/17 Tr., p.70, L.16 –
p.71, L.6.)  These factual findings are fully supported by the record, are not clearly erroneous,
and have not been challenged by the State on appeal.  The officers violated Mr. McGraw’s rights
under the Fourth Amendment when they prolonged the traffic stop in order to run a drug dog
around Ms. Killeen’s vehicle.  The district court correctly granted Mr. McGraw’s motion to
suppress.
CONCLUSION
Mr. McGraw respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court’s order granting
his motion to suppress.
DATED this 30th day of August, 2017.
___________/s/_____________________
ANDREA W. REYNOLDS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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